Three Dead as Ophelia Batters Ireland

Waves crash over the lighthouse as storm Ophelia passes Porthcawl, Wales, Britain, October 16, 2017. REUTERS/Rebecca Naden

By Clodagh Kilcoyne LAHINCH, Ireland, Oct 16 (Reuters) – Three people died as Tropical Storm Ophelia battered Ireland’s southern coast on Monday, knocking down trees and power lines and whipping up 10-metre (30-foot) waves.

Over 360,000 homes and businesses were without electricity with another 100,000 outages expected by nightfall, Ireland’s Electricity Supply Board said, describing it as an unprecedented event that would effect every part of the country for days.

Around 170 flights from Ireland’s two main airports at Dublin and Shannon were cancelled.

Two people were killed in separate incidents when trees fell on their cars — a woman in her 50s in the south east and a man on the east coast. Another man in his 30s died while trying to clear a fallen tree in an incident involving a chainsaw.

The storm, downgraded from a hurricane overnight, was the worst to hit Ireland in half a century. It made landfall after 10:40 a.m. (0940 GMT), the Irish National Meteorological Service said, with winds as strong as 190 kph (110 mph) hitting the most southerly tip of the country. Coastal flooding was likely.

“This storm is still very active and there are still very dangerous conditions in parts of the country. Do not be lulled into thinking this has passed,” the chairman of Ireland’s National Emergency Coordination Group, Sean Hogan, told national broadcaster RTE.

The armed forces were sent to bolster flood defences, public transport services and hospitals were closed and schools across Ireland and Northern Ireland will remain shut for a second day on Tuesday.

Hundreds of roads were blocked by fallen trees, Hogan said. Photos on social media showed roofs flying off buildings, including at Cork City soccer club’s Turner’s Cross stadium where the roof of one stand had collapsed.

Prime Minister Leo Varadkar advised people to stay indoors. The transport minister said it was not safe to drive.

The storm winds were due to peak between 1600 GMT and 1800 GMT in Dublin and Galway, two of Ireland’s most populous cities, and later on Monday in northern areas.

Britain’s meteorological service put an Amber Weather Warning into effect for Northern Ireland from 1400-2100 GMT, saying the storm posed a danger to life and was likely to cause transport cancellations, power cuts and flying debris.

It is expected to move towards western Scotland overnight and “impactful weather” is expected in other western and northern parts of the United Kingdom, it said.

British media are comparing Ophelia to the “Great Storm” of 1987, which subjected parts of the United Kingdom to hurricane strength winds 30 years ago to the day.

The Irish government said the storm was likely to be the worst since Hurricane Debbie, which killed 11 in Ireland in 1961.

It passed close to a western Ireland golf course owned by U.S. President Donald Trump, who has been planning a wall to protect its greens from coastal erosion.

Similar storms in the past have changed the shape of stretches of the Irish coastline, climatologists said. (Additional reporting and writing by Padraic Halpin and Conor Humphries; Editing by Catherine Evans)

(c) Copyright Thomson Reuters 2017.


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One Missing, Six Injured in Platform Explosion on Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana

Flames are seen after an explosion at an oil rig in Lake Pontchartrain, in Louisiana, in this still image taken from social media video taken October 15, 2017. Roger Fernandez/via REUTERS

One person is missing and six others have been injured after an explosion on an oil platform in Lake Pontchartrain near Kenner, Louisiana, Sunday evening, the Coast Guard has confirmed.

Coast Guard Sector New Orleans received a report from a witness at approximately 8 p.m. of an oil platform explosion.

The Coast Guard said Sunday night that one of the platform workers reported that eight people were aboard the platform at the time of the explosion, and one person did not make it to shore. Six of the seven people taken to shore were brought to the hospital, the Coast Guard said.

The Coast Guard is coordinating search efforts for the missing man. Sector New Orleans has launched a 29-foot Response Boat-Small boatcrew, a 45-foot Response Boat-Medium boatcrew, and a MH-65 Dolphin Helicopter air crew. Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries, Jefferson County Parish, and St. Charles Parish also have marine units on scene. Bayou Gauche Fire Department and a good Samaritan vessel are on scene fighting the fire, which has been reduced substantially, the Coast Guard said.

The name of the missing man is not being released at this time.

The cause of the incident is unknown, the Coast Guard said.

Kenner Police Department spokesman Sergeant Brian McGregor told the Times-Picayune newspaper earlier that there were “a lot of injuries,” with at least six confirmed and more expected.

St. Charles Parish said on its Facebook page that an oil rig was on fire in the lake near New Orleans and had “caused the loud sound earlier tonight.”


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Just Ten Rivers Contribute Most Plastic Pollution

By MarEx 2017-10-15 18:29:23

A group of scientists have found that up to 95 percent of plastic polluting the world’s oceans comes from just 10 rivers, eight of which are in Asia.

An estimated eight million of tons of plastic waste enter the world’s oceans every year, and rivers are major transporters of the pollution. 

Dr Christian Schmidt, a hydrogeologist from the Helmholtz-Centre for Environmental Research in Germany, and colleagues analyzed existing research involving 79 sampling sites along 57 rivers around the world to come up with the top 10 polluting rivers. The researchers’ calculations indicated that the amount of plastic in rivers was related to the mismanagement of plastic waste in their watersheds. 

The 10 Most Polluting Rivers

Yangtze – East China Sea, Asia
Indus – Arabian Sea, Asia
Yellow – Yellow Sea, Asia
Hai He – Yellow Sea, Asia
Nile – Mediterranean Sea, Africa
Ganges – Bay of Bengal, Asia
Pearl – South China Sea, Asia
Amur – Sea of Okhotsk, Asia
Niger – Gulf of Guinea, Africa
Mekong – South China Sea, Asia 

It is estimated that the amount of plastic rubbish in the world’s oceans will outweigh fish by 2050 unless drastic action is taken. The Daily Mail reports that one million plastic bottles are sold every minute and less than half are recycled. More than half of the plastic waste that flows into the oceans comes from five countries: China, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam and Sri Lankak, according to a study published in 2015. The only industrialized western country on the list of top 20 plastic polluters is the U.S. at position 20. 

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U.N. Imposes Global Ban for Ships Caught Carrying North Korean Contraband

The United Nations Security Council has banned four ships from ports globally for carrying coal from North Korea, including one vessel that also had ammunition, but the United States postponed a bid to blacklist four others pending further investigation.

The vessels are the first to be designated under stepped-up sanctions imposed on North Korea by the 15-member council in August and September over Pyongyang’s sixth and largest nuclear test and two long-range ballistic missile launches.

The Security Council North Korea sanctions committee, which operates by consensus, agreed at the request of the United States, to blacklist the ships on Oct. 3 for “transporting prohibited items from the DPRK” (North Korea), according to documents seen by Reuters on Tuesday.

A U.N. diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the four blacklisted ships and the four vessels still being investigated had been linked to illicit trade in North Korean coal. In November last year, the Security Council capped North Korean coal exports and then in August imposed a complete ban.

The 193 U.N. member states are now required to prohibit port entry to the Comoros-flagged Petrel 8, St. Kitts and Nevis-flagged Hao Fan 6, North Korean-flagged Tong San 2 and Cambodia-flagged Jie Shun. Entry is only allowed in case of emergency or if the vessel is returning to its home port.

The Jie Shun was intercepted by Egypt on Aug. 11, 2016, carrying 30,000 rocket propelled grenades in wooden crates concealed under about 2,300 tonnes of iron ore, according to U.N. sanctions monitors.

It was “the largest interdicted ammunition consignment in the history of sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” the independent sanctions monitors told the Security Council in their annual report in February.

The ship had left the North Korean port of Haeju on July 23, 2016, and was interdicted in Egyptian territorial waters south of the Suez Canal, the experts said.

North Korea is under a U.N. arms embargo and the Security Council has banned trade in exports such as coal, textiles, seafood, iron and other minerals to choke funding for Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear programs.

In an Oct. 3 note to the Security Council’s North Korea sanctions committee, seen by Reuters, the United States said it was withdrawing four ships it had proposed for listing – the South Korean-flagged Xin Shen Hai, the Palau-flagged East Glory 7, the Panama-flagged Kai Xiang and Cheng Hong.

“These four ships require further study with key parties and we will revert to the committee once that process is completed,” the U.S. mission to the United Nations wrote.

A ninth ship, the Fiji-flagged Toyo Maru, had been proposed for listing in an annex to the initial U.S. draft of a resolution adopted by the Security Council on Sept. 11. It was not clear if the United States still planned to put the ship forward for designation.

The U.N. Security Council has unanimously adopted nine sanctions resolutions on North Korea since 2006. (Reporting by Michelle Nichols; editing by Grant McCool and Tom Brown)

(c) Copyright Thomson Reuters 2017.

By Michelle Nichols UNITED NATIONS, Oct 10 (Reuters)


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North Sea Oil Squeezed as U.S. Ships Crude Like Never Before

The Bahamas-flagged Theo T departs Corpus Christi, Texas carrying the first U.S. crude export in 40 years, December 31, 2015. Photo: Port of Corpus Christi

By Javier Blas, Laura Hurst and Julian Lee (Bloomberg) — As crude oil gushes out of the U.S. like never before, it looks increasingly like North Sea oil will suffer collateral damage.

America exported a record high 1.98 million barrels a day of crude in the week ended Sept. 29, equal to the crude that normally gets shipped every day in the North Sea. Much of the U.S. outflow is going to Asia, which has become increasingly important in recent years in determining North Sea oil prices, effectively sandwiching Brent crude between bearish forces.

“It’s direct competition to North Sea production on many different fronts,” said Olivier Jakob, managing director at Petromatrix GmbH in Zug, Switzerland. Where U.S. exports go to Asia, “it will be more difficult for the North Sea to push some of its barrels outside of the region. It creates competition. It’s going to be a bearish factor for the North Sea market.”

The impact of rising American oil shipments on Brent — for many in the industry the most important crude benchmark — shows the increasingly disruptive force of U.S. crude in international markets. Washington in late 2015 lifted a 40-year ban on most oil exports, in the process reshaping the world’s energy map with U.S. crude being sent by trading houses such as Vitol Group and Trafigura Group to faraway locations including Switzerland, China and Israel. The U.S. export restrictions were imposed in the aftermath of the 1973-74 oil crisis.

U.S. producers ship barrels directly to refineries in Europe, placing the cargoes in competition with North Sea supply. At the same time, they’re sending a growing share to the prized Asian market. Refineries in China and South Korea in particular have become a critical source of demand for North Sea oil in recent years, helping to clear any oversupply out of the European market.

Of the flood of crude exported by the U.S. late last month, more than half went to East Asia and nearly a third was shipped to Northwest Europe and the Mediterranean region, according to a trader who’s monitoring the region’s exports. The remainder was shipped to the Caribbean and Latin America, the trader said. That’s in line with exports so far this year, according to data from the EIA and Kpler, a company that monitors ship movements.

The size of the U.S. exports — which has jumped from 25,000 barrels a day a decade ago to nearly 2 million barrels a day now — is now rivaling those from the North Sea. As a whole, North Sea flows have averaged 1.98 million barrels a day this year, according to loading programs compiled by Bloomberg. The flow of the key four regional crude streams — Brent, Forties, Oseberg and Ekofisk, which largely set the price of the benchmark — will run at about 820,000 barrels a day in November.

Widening Spread

U.S. crude has become increasingly attractive to foreign buyers in recent months due to the widening discount of West Texas Intermediate crude to Brent, the global benchmark. The spread started to expand in late July amid a tightening market for Brent and then ballooned in late August amid Hurricane Harvey. It reached $5.99 a barrel in intraday trading on Tuesday, remaining near its widest level in two years.

The exports surge has coincided with WTI becoming more of an international crude. Trading during Asian hours has risen sharply this year and stood at 18 percent of all activity in the third quarter, according to Owain Johnson, head of the energy research and product development team at CME Group Inc.

It’s not just the relative cheapness of WTI that’s hurting North Sea prices. Margins from turning crude into fuels are also sliding, creating downward pressure on Brent, according to Florian Thaler, an oil strategist at Signal Ocean. So-called hydroskimming margins, one of the simpler processes by which refineries can make fuels, fell to $3.15 a barrel on Oct. 9 for North Sea oil, data from Oil Analytics show. That’s down by more than 50 percent from the start of September, when Harvey temporarily slashed a quarter of U.S. processing capacity.

Slow Clearance

Added to that, U.S. exports are “clearly not helping the sweet-crude picture either,” with Brent-priced West African oil taking longer than normal to find buyers to Asia, Thaler said. Along with margins, that means prices for crudes with lower sulfur content in the Atlantic Basin are “a bit under pressure.”

Physical North Sea oil trades at differentials to regional benchmarks, and in late September, Forties was at three-year highs to its yardstick. Hurricane-related disruptions in the U.S. Gulf, which have now abated, originally helped to account for the high differentials, according to Petromatrix’s Jakob. Forties slipped to parity on Oct. 2 and other prices have been around that level in recent days.

“Two forces are at work” in weakening North Sea oil prices, said Eugene Lindell, an analyst at JBC Energy GmbH in Vienna. “Arbitrage inflows of U.S. crude into Europe are weighing” while WTI-priced crude is growing in appeal the world over due to its relative cheapness to Brent.

© 2017 Bloomberg L.P

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Trucking Problems Slow Aid Delivery in Puerto Rico

By MarEx 2017-10-09 21:12:15

The relief and recovery effort in Puerto Rico continues to pose unique difficulties for aid organizations and businesses alike: the destruction of the island’s electrical grid and communications infrastructure has made routine tasks much more difficult, adding friction to every point of the shoreside supply chain. 

With a shortage of truckers and extensive damage to the island’s roads, surface transportation has been a serious bottleneck. In addition, 70 percent of the island’s cell towers are down, making it difficult for dispatchers to reach customers and truckers. But one firm had its operations up and running as soon as cargo started to come in. “We were the only logistics provider that had truck power – albeit limited at the time – available as soon as the U.S. Coast Guard reopened the port in San Juan,” said Frank Larkin, senior vice president and general manager, Crowley logistics and commercial services “The port was reopened at 8 a.m. on Sept. 23, the first Crowley vessel was in discharging cargo at 10 a.m., and many of our truckers were right there to deliver relief cargo . . . when no other trucking or logistics company was providing transportation services.”

Since the storm ended, Crowley has handled 6,500 loads of cargo and 20 vessels, about one per day. It’s a mixture of aid and commercial goods, but the line between the two is thin, says Jose “Pache” Ayala, Crowley’s vice president for Puerto Rico services “When you consider that many people lost everything in the storm, all cargo is relief cargo, whether it comes from FEMA, a retail store or a grocery,” Ayala said. “That’s why the recovery of our commercial customers is so important.” 

These goods are mission-critical critical, but Ayala told USA Today that getting cargo to customers is still difficult due to the ongoing surface transportation problems. Three weeks after the storm, the terminal is sending boxes out the gate at about 70 percent of its normal rate, he said. It is storing about 3,400 containers, about twice the normal amount.

Jones Act waiver expires

As expected, the Trump administration allowed Puerto Rico’s 10-day Jones Act waiver to expire on Sunday, closing the door on the possibility of foreign-flagged ships carrying cargo between the U.S. mainland and the island territory. “We believe that extending the waiver is unnecessary to support the humanitarian relief efforts on the island,” Department of Homeland Security (DHS) press secretary David Lapan told CBS News. “There is an ample supply of Jones Act-qualified vessels to ensure that cargo is able to reach Puerto Rico.”

After the storm, the Jones Act came under fire from long-time critics like Senator John McCain (R-AZ), who argues that it raises costs for everyday goods and will impede the island’s economic recovery. DHS signaled last week that it would not bow to pressure from McCain and other critics of cabotage restrictions, who had called on the administration for a permanent waiver.

Hospitals still struggling

With most of the electrical grid offline, many of Puerto Rico’s hospitals are running on emergency backup power, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency has a plan in place for the growing possibility of generator failures. FEMA director Brock Long told media on Monday that when a hospital generator goes down, the patients in critical condition are flown to the hospital ship USNS Comfort, presently off the coast of the Arecibo-Manati region. 

On Saturday, Comfort took her second medevac flight of patients from a hospital with a failed generator, this time from Hospital Menonita in Caguas. The four patients were medevaced by aviators from the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp and USNS Comfort’s aircraft from Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 22, the “Sea Knights.” “The teamwork of Puerto Rico Department of Health, U.S. Health and Human Services, the JFLCC, USS Wasp, and Comfort led to the successful medevac,” said Capt. Kevin Robinson, mission commander aboard Comfort.

Navy aircrew medevacs patient from Hospital Menonita

Comfort has one of the largest trauma facilities in the United States – afloat or on shore – and she brought 800 Navy medical personnel to assist in the relief effort. Her crew has treated 75 Puerto Rican patients ranging from six months to 89 years in age, and have performed numerous procedures, including gastrostomy tube placement, colectomies, ulcer debridement, and treatment for wounds, hernias and pneumonia.

Comfort departed San Juan on October 5 to serve other communities around Puerto Rico. According to the Navy, her future itinerary will be based on assessments from the Department of Defense, Federal Emergency Management Agency and Puerto Rico’s Office of Emergency Management. 

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Container Ship Docks with 46-Foot Whale on Bow

A dead whale estimated to be 46 feet (14 meters) long was carried into New Zealand’s Port of Tauranga on the bow of a Maersk container ship on Wednesday.

The local Department of Conservation (DOC) says the Bryde’s whale was dead when the ship berthed. The death is viewed as an “unfortunate incident at sea,” says DOC, and the carcass has been removed.

The 4,250 TEUs Lexa Maersk sailed from Brisbane, Australia, and it is not known where she encountered the whale.

There are no agreed population estimates for Bryde’s whales in any ocean basin, but numbers are possibly in the tens of thousands worldwide. They are considered locally common in New Zealand waters, where they feed on schooling fish and krill. They reach 12-15 meters in length and a weight of 13-22 tons with females being larger than males.

It’s not the first time Maersk has made headlines for having a dead whale carried in to port on one of its ships. In 2012, Maersk Line told Facebook followers that does everything it can to avoid creating a negative impact on the marine environment. “Despite these efforts on Wednesday 6 June we saw images of a 12 meter long whale caught on the bulbous bow of the Maersk Norwich. This image, of a noble and elegant creature accidentally struck down by a Maersk Line vessel deeply affected us all.”

Maersk Line had strategy of turning negative stories, such as whale strike, into social media hits at the time, thanks to Jonathan Wichmann. He built the company’s social media based on the idea that social media is about communicating, not marketing.

When Maersk Norwich arrived in Rotterdam Harbor with the carcass on her bow, Wichmann was advised to keep a low profile on the news, but he felt social media gave the company a chance to explain what happened instead of other people telling the story.

Wichmann put up a Q & A explaining how it had happened. “People didn’t just call us whale killers,” he said. “They said that they were sad too about the whale.” The company launched a Pinterest tribute page In memory of the Maersk Norwich Whale.

There’s no indication on social media yet that Maersk will do something similar for the Lexa Maersk Whale.


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12 Fishermen Missing After Collision with Tanker

[Brief] On Thursday, the Japanese coast guard initiated a search for 12 missing crewmembers of the 300 gt Chinese fishing boat Lurong Yuanyu 378 after she collided with the 115,000 dwt tanker Brightoil Lucky. 

The vessels collided at a position about 250 nm north of Matsue, Japan, in the Sea of Japan (or the East Sea, as it is known in South Korea). The Japanese coast guard reported that the fishing vessel capsized, and that 12 of its 16 crewmembers are missing. The Lucky’s 21 seafarers were unharmed.

Following a request from Chinese SAR authorities, Japan’s Eighth Regional Coast Guard headquarters dispatched three patrol boats to conduct a search for the missing fishermen. The cause of the collision is under investigation.

The Brightoil Lucky, a 2009-built Aframax, was under way for the Russian oil port of Kozmino at the time of the collision. She is one of four vessels in her class in Brightoil Shipping Service’s fleet, and has no record of inspection deficiencies related to safety of navigation.

Brightoil is one of China’s largest privately held oil companies, and it has a wide array of petroleum investments, primarily in upstream oil and gas. The firm recently announced a plan to acquire large natural gas projects valued in the range of the $2-3 billion.


Original Source:

Dunkirk-Style Evacuation Underway In Vanuatu

Manaro Voui volcano Vanuatu
Smoke and ash emanates from the Manaro Voui volcano located on Vanuatu’s northern island Ambae in the South Pacific, October 1, 2017. REUTERS/Ben Bohane

by Alison Bevege (Reuters) – Vanuatu has launched a Dunkirk-style evacuation on the northern island of Ambae as a flotilla of boats rescues islanders from an erupting volcano.

The eruption has polluted many of the island’s water sources leaving thousands of people in need of safe drinking water, Red Cross delegate Joe Cropp told Reuters by phone on Sunday.

“Water is crucial,” he said. “It’s important to get on top of it right away.”

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Related Book: Trapped Under the Sea: One Engineering Marvel, Five Men, and a Disaster Ten Miles Into the Darkness by Neil Swidey

The Manaro Voui volcano, the nation’s largest, was seen hurling steam and rocks into the air by New Zealand vulcanologist Brad Scott who flew over the volcano on Saturday.

“Maybe about every 8 to 10 seconds there was an explosion, throwing lava bombs up maybe 50 to 100 meters above the crater and there’s also two small lava flows that are flowing across the island into the lake as well,” he said in an interview with Radio NZ published on Sunday.

Crowds of islanders from at least three evacuation points on the island have begun boarding a flotilla of ships including ferries, canoes and commercial vessels for the safety of surrounding islands Maewo, Pentecost and Santo.

The Vanuatu Government wants all 11,000 islanders evacuated by Oct. 6.

Australia sent amphibious Bay Class landing ship HMAS Choules on Saturday to help move the population, and it is expected to arrive by the middle of the week.

Some islanders are flying out while others have already moved to stay with friends or relatives in the capital, Port Vila.

More than 6000 people have gone to emergency shelters on the South Pacific island in preparation for the total evacuation.

Manaro Voui stirred to life in September, threatening island residents with burning ash, toxic gas and acid rain.

The volcano is crowned by crater lakes. One of them, Lake Voui, is directly on top of the eruption making it dangerously explosive and posing the deadly threat of a lahar: a boiling mud flow down the side of the mountain, Macquarie University vulcanologist Christopher Firth told Reuters by telephone on Saturday.

(The story corrects the name of the lake in the last paragraph to Voui, not Boui)
© 2017 Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved.

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Coast Guard Releases El Faro Investigation Report: Here’s the Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations

SS El Faro. Photo: Tote Maritime

The U.S. Coast Guard today has released the S.S. El Faro Marine Board of Investigation report, which includes a detailed account of the event along with the MBI’s conclusions on contributing factors and recommendations. 

The 199-page report identifies causal factors of the loss of the S.S. El Faro and 33 crew members on October 1, 2015, which ranks as one of the worst maritime disasters in American history. The 790-foot vessel set sail from Jacksonville, Florida, on a voyage to San Juan, Puerto Rico, on Sept. 29, 2015, and sank about a day and a half later off the Bahamas near the eye of Hurricane Joaquin.  

The report proposes a total of 31 safety recommendations and four administrative recommendations for future actions to the Commandant of the Coast Guard. Of note, the MBI recommends that the Coast Guard initiate a civil penalty against El Faro’s operator, TOTE Services, but the MBI does not recommend any suspension or revocation action against any credentialed mariner or criminal prosecution against any person or entity. The MBI also does not recommend any administrative or punitive action against any Coast Guard personnel.

“The most important thing to remember is that 33 people lost their lives in this tragedy. If adopted, we believe the safety recommendations in our report will improve safety of life at sea” said Capt. Jason Neubauer, chairman, El Faro Marine Board of Investigation, U.S. Coast Guard.

Coast Guard standard procedure and 46 USC 63 requires this type of report to be done for all marine casualties under Coast Guard authority.

The investigation was conducted by the U.S. Coast Guard with the full cooperation of the National Transportation Safety Board, which is conducting its own investigation into the accident. NTSB investigators will meet in December to determine probable cause and vote on safety recommendations identified their investigation. 

The Coast Guard Marine Board Investigation Report can be accessed along with other investigation documents at the following link

You can download the full report HERE (opens as PDF).

Below we have provided the Marine Board of Investigation’s executive summary, conclusions, and recommendations from the report.

Executive Summary

El Faro Final photo
The final photograph taken of the El Faro by TMPR Terminal Manager on September 29, 2015, showing starboard list of approximately 4 degrees during loading operations prior to the final voyage. Credit: U.S. Coast Guard

The loss of the U.S. flagged cargo vessel EL FARO, along with its 33 member crew, ranks as one of the worst maritime disasters in U.S. history, and resulted in the highest death toll from a U.S. commercial vessel sinking in almost 40 years. At the time of the sinking, EL FARO was on a U.S. domestic voyage with a full load of containers and roll-on roll-off cargo bound from Jacksonville, Florida to San Juan, Puerto Rico. As EL FARO departed port on September 29, 2015, a tropical weather system that had formed east of the Bahamas Islands was rapidly intensifying in strength. The storm system evolved into Hurricane Joaquin and defied weather forecasts and standard Atlantic Basin hurricane tracking by traveling southwest. As various weather updates were received onboard EL FARO, the Master directed the ship southward of the direct course to San Juan, which was the normal route. 

The Master’s southern deviation ultimately steered EL FARO almost directly towards the strengthening hurricane. As EL FARO began to encounter heavy seas and winds associated with the outer bands of Hurricane Joaquin, the vessel sustained a prolonged starboard list and began intermittently taking water into the interior of the ship. Shortly after 5:30 AM on the morning of October 1, 2015, flooding was identified in one of the vessel’s large cargo holds. At the same time, EL FARO engineers were struggling to maintain propulsion as the list and motion of the vessel increased. After making a turn to shift the vessel’s list to port, in order to close an open scuttle, EL FARO lost propulsion and began drifting beam to the hurricane force winds and seas. At approximately 7:00 AM, without propulsion and with uncontrolled flooding, the Master notified his company and signaled distress using EL FARO’s satellite distress communication system. Shortly after signaling distress, the Master ordered abandon ship. The vessel, at the time, was near the eye of Hurricane Joaquin, which had strengthened to a Category 3 storm. Rescue assets began search operations, and included a U.S. Air National Guard hurricane tracking aircraft overflight of the vessel’s last known position. After hurricane conditions subsided, the Coast Guard commenced additional search operations, with assistance from commercial assets contracted by the vessel’s owner. The search located EL FARO debris and one deceased crewmember. No survivors were located during these search and rescue operations. 

Illustration of significant events between 4:20 AM on October 1 and the sinking, showing ship heading and course over ground. Credit: U.S. Coast Guard

On October 31, 2015, a U.S. Navy surface asset contracted by the NTSB, using side-scan sonar, located the main wreckage of EL FARO at a depth of over 15,000 feet. EL FARO’s voyage data recorder was successfully recovered from EL FARO’s debris field on August 15, 2016, and it contained 26-hours of bridge audio recordings as well as other critical navigation data that were used by the MBI to help determine the circumstances leading up to this tragic incident. 

Over the course of the investigation the MBI relied on visits to EL FARO’s sister vessel, EL YUNQUE, to help understand the internal configuration of the PONCE class vessels and also identify operational and maintenance issues that could have impacted both vessels. 

The scope of the MBI was expanded to include the entire Coast Guard Alternate Compliance Program after Authorized Class Society performance and regulatory oversight concerns were noted for EL FARO, EL YUNQUE, and several additional U.S. flagged vessels in the program. 


The Marine Board of Investigation identified the following series of events and associated contributing factors. 

Event #1: EL FARO Sailed Within Close Proximity to Hurricane Joaquin 

TOTE did not ensure the safety of marine operations and failed to provide shore side nautical operations supports to its vessels. 

TOTE did not identify heavy weather as a risk in the Safety Management System (SMS) and the Coast Guard had not exercised its flag state authority to require identification of specific risks. 

TOTE and the Master did not adequately identify the risk of heavy weather when preparing, evaluating, and approving the voyage plan prior to departure on the accident voyage. 

TOTE and the Master and ship’s officers were not aware of vessel vulnerabilities and operating limitations in heavy weather conditions. 

TOTE did not provide the tools and protocols for accurate weather observations. The Master and navigation crew did not adequately or accurately assess and report observed weather conditions. 

TOTE did not provide adequate support and oversight to the crew of EL FARO during the accident voyage. 

The National Hurricane Center (NHC) created and distributed tropical weather forecasts for Tropical Storm and Hurricane Joaquin, which in later analysis proved to be inaccurate. Applied Weather Technologies used these inaccurate forecasts to create the Bon Voyage System (BVS) weather packages. 

The Master and deck officers were not aware of the inherent latency in the BVS data when compared to the NHC forecasts. Additionally, the Master and deck officers were not aware that they received one BVS data package with a redundant hurricane trackline. 

The Master and deck officers relied primarily on graphical BVS weather forecasts rather than the most current NHC data received via SAT-C. EL FARO crew did not take advantage of BVS’s tropical update feature and the ability to send BVS weather information directly to the bridge. 

The Master did not effectively integrate the use of Bridge Resource Management techniques during the accident voyage. Furthermore, the Master of EL FARO did not order a reduction in the speed or consider the limitations of the engineering plant as EL FARO converged on a rapidly intensifying hurricane. This resulted in loss of propulsion, cargo shifting and flooding. 

The Master of EL FARO failed to carry out his responsibilities and duties as Captain of the vessel between 8:00 PM on September 30 and 4:00 AM on October 1, 2015. Notably, the Master failed to download the 11:00 PM BVS data package, and failed to act on reports from the 3/M and 2/M regarding the increased severity and narrowing of the closest point of approach to Hurricane Joaquin, and the suggested course changes to the south to increase their distance from the hurricane. 

The cumulative effects of anxiety, fatigue, and vessel motion from heavy weather degraded the crew’s decision making and physical performance of duties during the accident voyage. 

Event #2: EL FARO Experienced an Initial Starboard List and Intermittent Flooding

EL FARO developed a sustained wind heel to starboard as a result of the course change from 155 degrees to 116 degrees after passing south of San Salvador at approximately 1:30 AM on October 1. The wind heel brought the 2nd deck closer to the water line. 

Intermittent flooding into one or more cargo holds on EL FARO began at this time. Water was able to enter Hold 3 through the open scuttle, and likely through deteriorated internal structures and open cargo hold ventilation fire dampers, which compromised watertight integrity. 

The increasing of EL FARO’s load line drafts following the 2005-2006 conversion, combined with loading to near full capacity with minimal stability margin, increased the vessel’s vulnerability to flooding in heavy weather. 

Despite the apparent increase in cargo carrying capacity and increase load line draft which would result, the 2005-2006 conversion was not designated as a major conversion by the Coast Guard. Based on the available documentation, the final decision was based on the “Precedence Principle,” in that the Coast Guard had previously not designated similar conversions of sister vessels EL YUNQUE and EL MORRO as major conversions. 

The crew’s complacency, lack of training and procedures, and EL FARO’s design contributed to the crew’s failure to assess whether the vessel’s watertight integrity was compromised. 

EL FARO’s conversion in 2005-2006, which converted outboard ballast tanks to fixed ballast, severely limited the vessel’s ability to improve stability at sea in the event of heavy weather or flooding. 

The Master, C/M, and crew did not ensure that stevedores and longshoremen secured cargo in accordance with the Cargo Securing Manual, which contributed to RO/RO cargo breaking free. 

The practice of sailing with open cargo hold ventilation system fire dampers in accordance with SOLAS II-2, Regulation 20 and U.S. regulations created a downflooding vulnerability which is not adequately considered for the purposes of intact and damage stability, nor for the definitions of weathertight and watertight closures for the purpose of the applicable Load Line Convention. 

The Coast Guard practice of verbally passing deficiency information to the ACS surveyor without written documentation of the deficient condition resulted in an unknown or incomplete compliance and material condition history of EL FARO. 

Event #3: EL FARO experienced a reduction in propulsion 

EL FARO’s reduction in speed, from approximately 16 knots to 9 knots that occurred between 3:45 AM to 4:15 AM on October 1 was the result of the routine blowing of tubes and the C/M making course changes. EL FARO never reached a speed through the water above 10 knots for the remainder of the voyage. 

EL FARO’s departure with a main lube oil sump level of 24.6”, which was below the Machinery Operating Manual recommended operating level of 27”, reduced the crew’s ability to maintain lube oil suction for the main propulsion plant. 

Prior to 4:36 AM, EL FARO’s main propulsion unit developed intermittent lube oil problems due to the starboard list. 

Event #4: EL FARO Incurred a Severe Port List and Lost Propulsion 

At 5:54 AM on October 1, the Master altered course to intentionally put the wind on the vessel’s starboard side to induce a port list and enable the C/M to access and close the Hold 3 starboard scuttle. This port list was exacerbated by his previous order to transfer ramp tank ballast to port, and resulted in a port list that was greater than the previous starboard list and a dynamic shifting of cargo and flood water. 

The port list, combined with the offset of the lube oil suction bellmouth 22” to starboard of centerline, resulted in the loss of lube oil suction and subsequent loss of propulsion at around 6:00 AM. 

Coast Guard and ABS plan review for EL FARO’s lube oil system did not consider the worst case angle of inclination in combination with the full range of lube oil sump operating levels specified in the machinery operating manual. This led the crew to operate with a lube oil sump level within the operating range specified on the Coast Guard and ABS approved drawing, but below the 27” operating level, which was the only level reviewed by ABS. 

The Master and C/E did not have a complete understanding of the vulnerabilities of the lube oil system design, specifically the offset suction. This lack of understanding hampered their ability to properly operate the ship in the prevailing conditions. 

TOTE’s lack of procedures for storm avoidance and vessel specific heavy weather plans containing engineering operating procedures for heavy weather contributed to the loss of propulsion. 

Event #5: EL FARO sank 

The loss of propulsion resulted in the vessel drifting and aligning with the trough of the sea, exposing the beam of the vessel to the full force of the sea and wind. 

Even after securing the scuttle to Hold 3, water continued to flood into cargo holds through ventilation openings, and also likely between cargo holds through leaking gaskets on large watertight cargo hold doors. 

The EL FARO crew did not have adequate knowledge of the ship or ship’s systems to identify the sources of the flooding, nor did they have equipment or training to properly respond to the flooding. 

Even though EL FARO met applicable intact and damage stability standards as loaded for the accident voyage, the vessel could not have survived uncontrolled flooding of even a single cargo hold given the extreme wind and sea conditions encountered in Hurricane Joaquin. 

Event #6: All 33 Persons Aboard EL FARO Are Missing and Presumed Deceased 

A lack of effective training and drills by crew members, and inadequate oversight by TOTE, Coast Guard and ABS, resulted in the crew and riding crew members being unprepared to undertake the proper actions required for surviving in an abandon ship scenario. 

After 5:43 AM on October 1, the Master failed to recognize the magnitude of the threat presented by the flooding into the hold combined with the heavy weather conditions. The Master did not take appropriate action commensurate with the emergent nature of the situation onboard EL FARO, including alerting the crew and making preparations for abandoning ship. 

When the Master made the decision to abandon ship, approximately 10 minutes before the vessel sank, he did not make a final distress notification to shore to update his earlier report to TOTE’s Designated Person Ashore that they were not abandoning ship. This delayed the Coast Guard’s awareness that EL FARO was sinking and the crew was abandoning ship, and impacted the Coast Guard’s search and rescue operation. 

Although EL FARO’s open lifeboats met applicable standards (SOLAS 60), they were completely inadequate to be considered as an option for the crew to abandon ship in the prevailing conditions. 

The Coast Guard’s existing Search and Rescue equipment and procedures were unable to effectively mark and track a deceased EL FARO crew member for eventual recovery. As a result the crew member remains missing and unidentified. 

Safety Recommendations 

Recommendation #1 – High Water Alarms. It is recommended that Commandant direct a regulatory initiative to require high water audio and visual alarms, capable of providing audible and visual alarms on the navigation bridge, in cargo holds of dry cargo vessels. Furthermore, it is recommended that Commandant work with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to amend the applicability of SOLAS Chapter II-1/25 (2015 consolidated) to include all new and existing multi-hold cargo ships. 

Recommendation #2 – Ventilators and Other Hull Openings for Cargo Ships. It is recommended that Commandant direct a review of U.S. regulations, international conventions, and technical policy to initiate revisions to ensure that all ventilators or other hull openings, which cannot be closed watertight or are required to remain normally open due to operational reasons such as continuous positive pressure ventilation, should be considered as down-flooding points for intact and damage stability. Additionally, fire dampers or other closures protecting openings required to remain normally open due to operational reasons such as continuous positive pressure ventilation should not be considered weathertight closures for the purpose of the applicable Load Line Convention. These changes should apply to new and existing vessels. 

Recommendation #3 – Addressing Safety Concerns Related to Open Lifeboats. It is recommended that Commandant initiate a Legislative Change Proposal and direct a regulatory initiative to eliminate open top gravity launched lifeboats for all oceangoing ships in the U.S. commercial fleet. As an immediate interim safety measure, it is recommended Commandant direct all Officers in Charge of Marine Inspection (OCMIs) to conduct a concentrated inspection campaign on all existing vessels outfitted with gravity launched open lifeboats, including a Coast Guard supervised launching and underway operational test of every lifeboat in service. This concentrated inspection campaign should also ensure that companies have adequately identified and addressed the hazards related to operating with open top gravity launched lifeboats in their identified Safety Management System (SMS) risks.   

Recommendation #4 – Indicators for Watertight Closures on Bridge Alarm Panels. It is recommended that Commandant direct a regulatory initiative to require open/close indicators on the bridge of all existing cargo ships, for all watertight closures that are identified as watertight on the conditions of assignment for assignment of load line form for unmanned and cargo spaces. Furthermore, it is recommended that Commandant work with the IMO to amend the applicability of paragraph 3 of SOLAS II-1/13-1 (2015 consolidated) to include all existing cargo ships. This change would require open/close indicators on the bridge of all existing cargo ships, for all watertight closures (e.g., doors, scuttles, fire dampers) that are identified as watertight on the conditions of assignment for assignment of load line form for unmanned compartments and cargo spaces. 

Recommendation #5 – Requirement for Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Camera Installation in Stowage Areas. It is recommended that Commandant direct a regulatory initiative to require the installation of CCTV cameras to monitor unmanned spaces from the bridge cargo vessels, such as cargo holds and steering compartments. Furthermore, it is recommended that Commandant work with the IMO to create a new requirement to install and utilize CCTV cameras, or other similar technology, in cargo stowage areas on cargo ships. 

Recommendation #6 – Vessel Weight Change Tracking. It is recommended that Commandant direct a regulatory initiative to require that a company maintain an onboard and shore side record of all incremental vessel weight changes, to track weight changes over time so that the aggregate total may be readily determined. 

Recommendation #7 – Approval of Software for Cargo Loading and Securing. It is recommended that Commandant direct a regulatory initiative to require review and approval of software that is used to perform cargo loading and securing calculations. Furthermore, it is recommended that Commandant work with the IMO to implement international requirements for review and approval of such software. 

Recommendation #8 – Review and Approval of Stability Software. It is recommended that Commandant update policy to address Coast Guard review and approval of stability software, and delegate review and approval authority to ACSs, where appropriate. This should include establishing specific policy and assigning technical requirements for review and approval of stability software by the Coast Guard, which may be required to review and approve such software for vessels that do not fall under the Alternate Compliance Program (ACP) or Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) 3-97 authorities. 

Recommendation #9 – Float-free Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) Equipped with an Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB). It is recommended that Commandant direct a regulatory initiative to require that all VDR capsules be installed in a float-free arrangement, and contain an integrated EPIRB for all domestic vessels currently required to be equipped with a VDR. Furthermore, it is recommended that Commandant work with the IMO to amend SOLAS V/20 (2015 consolidated) to require this VDR configuration for existing vessels. 

Recommendation #10 – Locating and Marking Objects in the Water. It is recommended that Commandant direct an examination of the reliability rate of SLDMBs and other similar technology used during Coast Guard Search and Rescue operations. Additionally, the Coast Guard should develop pre-deployment protocols to conduct circuit testing on beacons prior to deploying them on-scene. 

Recommendation #11 – Attachable Beacon for Assisting in Relocating Search Objects that are Initially Unrecoverable. It is recommended that Commandant identify and procure equipment that will provide search and rescue units the ability to attach a radio or Automated Identification System/strobe beacon to a found search object that is not immediately retrievable. This beacon should be able to be quickly activated and attached to the object, and have a lanyard of sufficient length to keep the beacon on the surface of the water if the object sinks below the surface. 

Recommendation #12 – Personal Locator Beacon Requirement. It is recommended that Commandant direct a regulatory initiative to require that all Personal Flotation Devices on oceangoing commercial vessels be outfitted with a Personal Locator Beacon. 

Recommendation #13 – Anonymous Safety Reporting to Shore for Ships at Sea. It is recommended that Commandant direct the development of a shipboard emergency alert system that would provide an anonymous reporting mechanism for crew members to communicate directly with the Designated Person Ashore or the Coast Guard while the ship is at sea. The system would be in place to report urgent and dire safety concerns that are not being adequately addressed onboard the ship or by shore based company resources in a timely manner. 

Recommendation #14 – National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Evaluation of Forecast Staffing and Products for Maritime Interests. It is recommended that Commandant request that NOAA evaluate the effectiveness and responsiveness of current National Weather Service (NWS) tropical cyclone forecast products, specifically in relation to storms that may not make landfall but that may impact maritime interests. To improve service to marine stakeholders the evaluation should consider the inclusion of past track waypoints for the tropical system for a period of 48 hours and a graphical depiction of the forecast model track of the best performing prediction models. 

Recommendation #15 – Clarification of Flag State Expectations for SMS Implementation. It is recommended that Commandant direct the development and implementation of policy to make it clear that the Coast Guard has a shared responsibility to assess the adequacy of a company’s SMS. This responsibility includes, but is not limited to, assessing identified risks and contingency plans (as described in IMO Resolution A.1072(28)), and ensuring that the duties, authorities, and qualifications of the Designated Person Ashore and other shore side management who support vessel operations while underway are specifically described. 

Recommendation #16 – Damage Control Information for Existing Cargo Vessels. It is recommended that Commandant direct a regulatory initiative to require that all cargo ships have a plan and booklets outlining damage control information. Furthermore, it is recommended that Commandant work with the IMO to amend the applicability of SOLAS Chapter II-1/19 (2015 consolidated), to apply to all existing cargo ships, ensuring these ships have the damage control information. 

Recommendation #17 – Ship Specific Damage Control Competency. It is recommended that Commandant direct a regulatory initiative to update 46 CFR to establish damage control training and drill requirements for commercial, inspected vessels. Furthermore, it is recommended that Commandant work with the IMO to amend SOLAS to establish similar requirements. 

Recommendation #18 – Evaluation of Mariner Training Institutions and Coast Guard Merchant Mariner Credentialing Process. It is recommended that Commandant direct a review of the EL FARO VDR transcript and this Report of Investigation, specifically focusing on the effectiveness of the Coast Guard credentialing exams and third party provided training including navigation simulators, heavy weather avoidance, cargo lashing/securing, stability, damage control, and bridge resource management. The Coast Guard should use the review to identify potential areas and competencies needing improvement and expeditiously develop a plan to implement those findings into the mariner credentialing process. 

Recommendation #19 – Electronic Records and Remote Monitoring of Vessels at Sea. It is recommended that Commandant direct a regulatory initiative to require electronic records and periodic electronic transmission of records and data to shore from oceangoing commercial ships. This requirement would include records such as bridge and engine room logs, Standards of Training Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) records, significant route changes, critical alarms, and fuel/oil records. The regulation should ensure Coast Guard access to these records regardless of their location. Furthermore, it is recommended that Commandant work with the IMO to amend SOLAS to require this same electronic transmission of records from all oceangoing commercial ships. 

Recommendation #20 – Prevention Training Course for Prospective Coast Guard Sector Commanders and Deputies. It is recommended that Commandant explore adding an OCMI segment to Training Center Yorktown’s Sector Commander Indoctrination Course for prospective officers who do not have the Prevention Ashore Officer Specialty Code, OAP-10. The recommended OCMI training segment would be similar to the additional Search and Rescue (SAR) Mission Coordinator Course that is currently required for prospective Sector Commanders and Deputies who lack previous SAR experience. 

Recommendation #21 – Coast Guard Oversight of ACSs that Conduct ACP Activities. It is recommended that Commandant update NVIC 2-95 and Marine Safety Manual Volume II to require increased frequency of ACS and Third Party Organizations (TPOs) direct oversight by attendance of Coast Guard during Safety Management Certificate and Document of Compliance audits. Additionally, the Coast Guard shall perform a quality audit specific to the ACS representation and performance on U.S. flag vessels. The Coast Guard personnel conducting the oversight should be fully trained and certified to conduct audits, and given clear authority to issue non-conformities to a vessel, company, or ACS. 

Recommendation #22 – ACP Efficiency and Manageability. It is recommended that Commandant direct a regulatory initiative to revise 46 CFR § 8.430 in order to eliminate the use of U.S. Supplements that currently exist for each ACS authorized to conduct all delegated activities. The regulatory revision should clarify that ACS personnel shall default to 46 CFR requirements in circumstances identified in the Critical Ship Safety Systems Table in the Federal Register on February 13, 1998 (63 FR 7495).439 

Recommendation #23 – ACS Accountability and Transparency. It is recommended that Commandant establish and publish an annual report of domestic vessel compliance. This report shall include domestic vessel no-sail rates for each type of inspected subchapter, and a methodology for associating a Coast Guard-issued no-sail control action with an ACS, for vessels found to have deficiencies or major non-conformities that were misclassified, or not previously identified during an ACS-led inspection or survey. 

Recommendation #24 – ACS Surveyor Performance and Interactions with OCMIs. It is recommended that Commandant direct the implementation of a policy requiring that individual ACS surveyors complete an assessment process, approved by the cognizant OCMI, for each type of delegated activity being conducted on behalf of the Coast Guard. The assessment shall ensure vessel surveys and audits meet the Coast Guard marine inspection standard. If an OCMI determines that an ACS surveyor’s performance is substandard, that OCMI should be given the authority to revoke the Surveyor’s authority to conduct surveys on their behalf. 

Recommendation #25 – Competency for Steamship Inspections. It is recommended that Commandant direct a study to explore adding a Steam Plant Inspection course to the Training Center Yorktown curriculum. The course should be required for Coast Guard Marine Inspectors and made available to ACS surveyors who conduct inspections on behalf of the Coast Guard. The steam inspection course could serve as an interim measure until an Advanced Journeyman Course covering steam vessel inspections is implemented (please see Recommendation #26). 

Recommendation #26 – Competency for Marine Inspections and ACS Surveyors Conducting Inspections on Behalf of the Coast Guard. It is recommended that Commandant direct the addition of an Advanced Journeyman Inspector course to the Training Center Yorktown curriculum. The course should cover ACS oversight, auditing responsibilities, and the inspection of unique vessel types. The course should be required for senior Coast Guard Marine Inspectors and made available to ACS surveyors who conduct inspections on behalf of the Coast Guard. 

Recommendation #27 – Coast Guard Major Conversion Determinations for Vessels. It is recommended that Commandant direct the review of policies and procedures for making and documenting major conversion determinations, including use of the Precedence Principle. 

Recommendation #28 – Intact and Damage Stability Standards Review. It is recommended that Commandant direct a review of current intact and damage stability standards to improve vessel survivability in extreme wind and sea conditions. 

Recommendation #29 – Applying Intact and Damage Stability Standards to Existing Cargo Vessels. It is recommended that Commandant direct a regulatory initiative to require that all existing cargo vessels meet the most current intact and damage stability standards. 

Recommendation #30 – Third Party Oversight National Center of Expertise. It is recommended that Commandant consider creation of a Third Party Oversight National Center of Expertise to conduct comprehensive and targeted oversight activities on all third party organizations and ACSs that perform work on behalf of the Coast Guard. The Center of Expertise should be staffed with Subject Matter Experts that are highly trained inspectors, investigators, and auditors with the capability and authority to audit all aspects of third party organizations. As an alternative, the Coast Guard could add a new Third Party Oversight Office at Coast Guard Headquarters with a similar staffing model as the proposed Center of Expertise. The new Third Party Oversight Office could function similar to the Traveling Inspector Office and report directly to the Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy. 

Recommendation #31 – Technical Review of Critical Propulsion System Components. It is recommended that Commandant immediately review a representative sample of existing engineering system plans and implement a policy to ensure future Coast Guard or ACS reviews of such plans consider the full designed operating range when reviewing design elements for critical propulsion system components (e.g., the operating range for lube oil systems should ensure satisfactory function for the full range of allowable oil sump levels and vessel lists.) 

Administrative Recommendations

Administrative Recommendation #1 – Acquiring DNA Sample for Identification of Human Remains. It is recommended that Commandant direct the development and implementation of Coast Guard policy for the collection of DNA samples by Coast Guard personnel when deceased individuals are unable to be recovered during Search and Rescue cases or post-incident marine casualty investigations. These DNA samples could be used to provide identification of human remains

Administrative Recommendation #2 – VDR Performance Standards. It is recommended that Commandant direct a regulatory initiative to require that all VDRs capture all communications on ship’s internal telephone systems. Furthermore, it is recommended that Commandant work with the IMO to amend SOLAS and update performance standards to ensure that all VDRs capture these two-way internal ship communications.

Administrative Recommendation #3 – VDR Data and Audio Access. It is recommended that Commandant initiate a Legislative Change Proposal to amend 46 U.S.C. Chapter 63, to ensure that, notwithstanding NTSB statutory authority, the Coast Guard has full access and ability to use VDR data and audio in marine casualty investigations, regardless of which agency is the investigative lead.

Administrative Recommendation #4 – MISLE Documentation of Deficiencies that the OCMI Refers to an ACS. It is recommended That Commandant require the addition of specific MISLE data fields for documenting deficiencies that the OCMI refers to an ACS for correction. The deficiency with a written report documenting corrective action has been completed or the condition has been appropriately record in the Class database. This will ensure that vessel compliance history is documented and accessible to Coast Guard Marine Inspectors and investigators.

Enforcement Recommendations

Recommendation #1 – TOTE Services Violations. It is recommended that Sector Jacksonville initiate civil penalty action against TOTE Services for the following offenses:

  • Failure to comply with work-rest requirements detailed in 46 U.S.C. § 8104 and 46 CFR § 15.1111 for EL FARO crew members on multiple dates prior to the accident voyage.
  • Failure to comply with emergency procedures for special personnel detailed in 46 CFR § 199.180. Specifically, Polish ship rider Mr. Marek Pupp testified that the continued to work on EL FARO during the emergency muster and abandon ship drills.
  • Failure to notify Coast Guard or ABS of repairs to primary lifesaving appliances that were conducted on September 28, 2015 just prior to EL FARO’s departure from Jacksonville on the accident voyage.
  • Failure to notify the Coast Guard or ABS of repairs to EL FARO’s main propulsion boiler superheating piping on August 24, 2015.

Based on the findings of this investigation, the MBI does not recommend any administrative or punitive action against any Coast Guard personnel. The MBI does not recommend any suspension or revocation action against any credentialed mariner. Additionally, the MBI does not recommend criminal prosecution against any person or entity.

The Coast Guard Marine Board Investigation Report can be accessed along with other investigation documents at the following link

Or you can download the full report HERE (opens as PDF).

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